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Abstract
Deep neural networks have been shown vulnerable to
adversarial patches, where exotic patterns can result
in models wrong prediction. Nevertheless, existing ap-
proaches to adversarial patch generation hardly con-
sider the contextual consistency between patches and
the image background, causing such patches to be eas-
ily detected and adversarial attacks to fail. On the other
hand, these methods require a large amount of data for
training, which is computationally expensive. To over-
come these challenges, we propose an approach to gen-
erate adversarial yet inconspicuous patches with one
single image. In our approach, adversarial patches are
produced in a coarse-to-fine way with multiple scales
of generators and discriminators. Contextual informa-
tion is encoded during the Min-Max training to make
patches consistent with surroundings. The selection of
patch location is based on the perceptual sensitivity of
victim models. Through extensive experiments, our ap-
proach shows strong attacking ability in both the white-
box and black-box setting. Experiments on saliency de-
tection and user evaluation indicate that our adversar-
ial patches can evade human observations, demonstrate
the inconspicuousness of our approach. Lastly, we show
that our approach preserves the attack ability in the
physical world.
Introduction
Recent years have witnessed the increasing trend of Deep
Neural Networks (DNN) applied in many domains. How-
ever, despite its popularity, DNN has been shown suscep-
tible to Adversarial Examples (AE) where negligible noise
perturbations (Szegedy et al. 2014) can successfully fool the
classifier. Such small perturbations can lead DNN’s predic-
tion into either an intentionally-chosen class (targeted at-
tack) or classes that are different from the true label (un-
targeted attack). Extensive researches have studied to gen-
erate strong AEs (Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard
2016; Carlini and Wagner 2017; Papernot et al. 2016; Su,
Vargas, and Sakurai 2019; Liu et al. 2019b). To make at-
tacks applicable in physical world, adversarial patch-based
attack (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016; Brown et al.
2017; Wiyatno and Xu 2019; Li, Schmidt, and Kolter 2019)
are proposed. Different from adversarial perturbations added
to whole images, such attacks modify pixels within a re-
stricted region to generate malicious patches and fool the
DNN model. The existence of adversarial patches intensi-
fies people’s concerns on the security of deep learning based
applications in real world, such as auto-driving system and
identity recognition devices.
To launch an effective and strong attack in physical word,
adversarial patches break the lp norm limitations for adver-
sarial perturbations. The consequence is that existing adver-
sarial patches are usually ended being noticeable for the hu-
man observer because of their exotic appearance. Note that,
if the attacks are easily detected, the attacks will fail in prac-
tice with a great chance. So it is significant for adversaries to
consider adversarial patches that are inconspicuous or even
invisible to human. Nevertheless, this haven’t attracted much
attention and few works appear. Liu et al. observed there are
often scrawls and patches on traffic signs in the real world,
and firstly attempted to enhance the visual fidelity while try-
ing to preserve the attack ability. Jia et al. encoded the mali-
cious information as watermarks to evade detection.
In addition, existing methods (Brown et al. 2017; Liu et al.
2019a) require a large amount of quality data (e.g. Ima-
geNet) for training, which is computationally expensive and
time-consuming. Apart from the high demand of compu-
tation resources, data scarcity is becoming an increasingly
troublesome problem. Sensitive data under privacy protec-
tion are often out of reach in many situations for training ad-
versaries. The above two problems make current adversarial
patch generation methods inappropriate in practice.
Towards bridging research gaps mentioned above, we pro-
pose a GAN-based approach to generate Adversarial yet In-
conspicuous Patches (AIP) trained from one single image.
Our approach captures the most sensitive area of the victim
image, and applies adversarial patches generated with well-
crafted objective functions. The goals of AIP are (1) crafting
adversarial patches with limited data, and (2) evading human
detection while keeping attacks successful. Through exper-
iments in digital settings, adversarial patches generated by
AIP achieved high attack success rates. Saliency detection
and human evaluation shows that our less-noticeable patches
highly reduced the risk of being detected before attacks. In
the last, we apply AIP in physical scenarios to inspire future
directions on developing real-world patch attack.
In summary, the key contributions of this paper are as fol-
lows:
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• To the best of our knowledge, we are pioneering to study
on generating inconspicuous adversarial patches to evade
detection. We propose a novel approach AIP to generate
such adversarial patches from one single image while pre-
serving strong attack ability.
• Through extensive experiments, our approach performs
well in both white-box and black-box settings, and can
be used in physical attack. Meanwhile, we demonstrate
that such adversarial patches are able to evade detec-
tion, which increases the potential threats of adversarial
patches.
Related Work
In this section, we review the prior work of adversarial at-
tacks and adversarial example detection.
Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial examples were first discovered (Szegedy et al.
2014). Szegedy et al. added some imperceptible noises on
the clean image, and misled well-trained classification mod-
els successfully. This greatly attracted researchers’ attention
and extensive attacks are developed since then. According to
the restrictions when crafting adversarial examples, adver-
sarial examples can be roughly categorized into three types:
perturbation-based, patch-based, and unrestricted adversar-
ial examples.
Adversarial Perturbation. Following (Szegedy et al.
2014), more perturbation-based attacks are proposed in re-
cent years. Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy proposed Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) to generate adversarial ex-
amples fast and effectively. Trame`r et al.; Kurakin, Good-
fellow, and Bengio enhanced FGSM with a randomization
step or multiple gradient steps. More representative attacks
like (Papernot et al. 2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and
Frossard 2016; Carlini and Wagner 2017; Madry et al. 2018)
explore possibilities of attacks in different ways. But these
methods shares common restrictions on the norm of pertur-
bations, where a noise budget  is given. The goal of such
attacks is to find adversarial examples with small  so that
the perturbations are ensured to be imperceptible to human
eyes.
Adversarial Patch. Adversarial patches are inspired by
the pixel attack (Su, Vargas, and Sakurai 2019) that changes
only one pixel to arbitrary value. However, the success rate
of pixel attacks is usually low because the change is minor,
especially for high resolution images. Patch-based attacks
break the restriction in pixel attack that only one pixel is re-
placed, which makes the attack more efficient and applicable
in physical world. Adversarial patches, were first generated
by (Brown et al. 2017) in 2017. By masking relatively small
patches on the image, such attack causes classifiers to ig-
nore other scenery semantics and report a false prediction.
Eykholt et al. generates robust patches under different phys-
ical conditions to fool the classification of real-world road
sign. Some authors also investigated adversarial patches for
attacking object detection models tested in digital settings
(Liu et al. 2019c) and physical settings (Thys, Ranst, and
Goedeme 2019; Lee and Kolter 2019).
Though existing adversarial patches have great attack
ability, they are highly conspicuous. If there are any detec-
tion, such patches will be spotted, leading to failures of the
attacks. To make adversarial patches bypass potential detec-
tion, Liu et al. generates more realistic patches with Gen-
erative Adversarial Nets (GAN) (Goodfellow et al. 2014).
In (Jia et al. 2020), the malicious area is disguised as wa-
termarks to evade detection. Their approaches assume that
people’s understanding of the image content is not affected
by such semi-transparent perturbations and hence people’s
consciousness will not be aroused.
Unrestricted Adversarial Examples. When generating
the above discussed adversarial examples, there are always
restrictions like the perturbations’ norm or the patch size.
The reason that such restrictions exist is that attacks nat-
urally have to be undetectable or difficult to detect. Unre-
stricted adversarial examples occur along with the quick de-
velopment of GAN, since identifying images synthesized
GAN from natural images in a glance becomes impossi-
ble for human. Unrestricted adversarial examples are first
discovered by (Song et al. 2018). They employed GAN to
approximate the distribution of training data, then searched
for adversarial examples within the distribution. (Qiu et al.
2019) directly manipulates latent vectors of images which
contains semantic information, and inputs the latent vector
to GAN so that adversarial examples are disguised as natural
images.
Adversarial Example Detection
In practice, adversarial example detection is one of ef-
fective defenses on adversarial examples. Lu, Issaranon,
and Forsyth assumed adversarial examples produce differ-
ent patterns of activation functions, proposed to append a
SVM classifier to detect adversarial perturbations. Simi-
larly, Metzen et al.; Meng and Chen attached subnetworks
which are trained for classification of benign and malicious
data. Statistics of convolutions in CNN-based networks are
used for detection in (Li and Li 2017). Feature squeezing
is also an effective approach to detect adversarial perturba-
tions (Xu, Evans, and Qi 2017).
However, to our best knowledge, the current research still
lacks comprehensive studies on automatic detection of ad-
versarial patches trained on large-scale datasets. One pos-
sible reason is that existing adversarial patches preferably
emphasize on the attack ability, so they cannot even escape
from human observation. Our paper would be a pioneering
work in which adversarial patches are imperceptible to some
extent while preserving strong attack ability. We hope our
work could shed some light on benchmarks of inconspicu-
ous patch-based attacks in the future, and inspire researchers
to develop defense algorithms robust to adversarial patches.
Our Approach
In this section, we first introduce the problem definition, then
elaborate the framework and formulation of our proposed
patch-based attack named AIP.
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Figure 1: The Overall Structure of Our Approach
Problem Definition
Patch-based attack is created by completely replacing a part
of original image. Given a victim image x of size (H,W ),
we aim to generate an adversarial patch p of size (h,w),
which can result in prediction errors of well-trained tar-
get models f . We attach p with a location mask m ∈
{0, 1}(H×W ) onto the victim image. The new image is given
by
x′ = m⊗ p+ (1−m)⊗ x, (1)
where⊗ is the element-wise multiplication for matrices, and
p is padding to same size of x. For the ease of reading, we
replace the masking process described in Equation 1 with an
abstracted notion ⊕ in the following sections:
x′ = p⊕ x. (2)
With such adversarial patch, the prediction of x′ is expressed
as f(x′), which differs from the original prediction f(x).
AIP Framework
The overview of our framework is illustrated in Figure 1.
Given a target image, we first generate an attention map with
target models in white-box setting and pretrained models in
black-box setting, which captures the sensitivity of models’
output with respect to the input image. The areas in red are
better candidates recommended to attack than areas in blue.
After deciding the victim area, we take a larger patch con-
taining the recommended location, which we call the context
C. Then, the victim area and its surrounding context will be
sent to the core component to generate adversarial patches.
Here we take the attack ability and visual fidelity into ac-
count, and adopt a coarse-to-fine process using GAN with
different scales for inconspicuous adversarial patch gener-
ation. Different from existing methods, our approach takes
only one single image as training data. Inspired by (Shaham,
Dekel, and Michaeli 2019; Shocher et al. 2019), we adopt a
multi-scale GAN so that the generator could approximate
the internal statistics within the single image and produce
realistic patches.
Multi-Scale Patch Generation. In our approach,
we deploy a series of generator-discriminator pairs
{(G0, D0), . . . , (GK , DK)}, where K is the total number
of scales in the structure. As shown in Figure 2, these
generator-discriminator pairs are trained against an image
pyramid of p and C. Correspondingly, the image pyramid
is expressed as {(p0, C0) . . . (pK , CK)}, where pi and Ci
are downsampled version of p and C with a factor rK−i
(0 < r < 1).
In every scale, we execute adversarial training for gen-
erators and discriminators. The generator Gi is expected to
produce realistic patches, and the discriminator attempts to
distinguish generated samples from pi. Since our approach
requires the generated patches to be consistent with original
images, the input of discriminator is the surrounding context
Ci with the intermediate patches pi placed right at the center
of context. During training, the background information will
be encoded to the generator progressively.
As we can see from Figure 2, the generation of patches
happens in a sequential way, which starts at the coarsest
scale and ends at the finest scale. Except the first genera-
tor, other generators take the output from coarser scale and
noises as the new input. Specifically, the generated patch
from coarser scales is upsampled and serves as a prior for
the generators in finer scales. Random noises z are used for
diversity of generation. Finally, our generator at the finest
scale GK will output adversarial patches p˜ of size (h,w) on
a prospective location L of the victim image x.
Objective Functions
As presented above, each generator is coupled with a Marko-
vian discriminator (Li and Wand 2016), and there is no dif-
DS
𝐺0
𝐷0
𝐺1 𝐺𝐾……
𝐷1 𝐷𝐾
……
…
…
…
Down-sample 
(DS)
Up-sample (US) US
𝑧0
෤𝑝0
𝐶 𝐶
DS
𝐶
DS
𝐶 𝐶
…𝐶
෤𝑝1 ෤𝑝𝐾
…
𝑧1 𝑧𝐾
US
Figure 2: Structure of coarse-to-fine pipeline
ference for training in different scales. So we take the ith
scale to elaborate the training details.
We denote the output of Gi−1 as p˜i−1, then the input for
Gi is
p˜i = Gi (zi, (p¯i−1) ↑r) , (3)
where p¯i−1 ↑r is the upsampled patch of p˜i−1.
The adversarial loss (Goodfellow et al. 2014) can be writ-
ten as
LGAN =Epi∼x logD(pi, Ci)+
Ezi∼Pz log(1−D(G(zi, p˜i−1), Ci)),
(4)
where Pz is a prior for noises. The discriminator D for
AIP has two functionalities: (1) distinguishing the generated
sample G(zi, p˜i−1) from the original patch pi, and (2) mak-
ing sure the patch is consistent with the context C.
The loss for fooling target model f in untargeted attacks
is
Lfadv = Ex`f (x⊕ p¯i ↑r, y), (5)
where `f denotes the loss function used in the training of f ,
and y is the true class of x. Note that it is feasible to replace
y with labels of other classes to perform targeted attacks.
To stabilize the training of GAN, we add the reconstruc-
tion loss
Lrec = ‖Gi (zi, p˜i−1)− pi‖2 . (6)
We also add a total variation loss
Ltv =
h∑
a=0
w∑
b=0
(
∣∣∣p(a+1,b)i − p(a,b)i ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣p(a,b+1)i − p(a,b)i ∣∣∣)
(7)
as a regularization term to ensure that the texture of gen-
erated patches is smooth enough. Finally, the full objective
function in ith scale can be expressed as
L = Lfadv + αLGAN + βLrec + γLtv, (8)
where α, β and γ are to balance the relative importance of
each loss. Then we train our generator and discriminator by
solving the min-max game as
argmin
Gi
max
Di
L (Gi, Di) . (9)
As shown in Algorithm 1, starting from the coarsest scale,
our generative models is trained sequentially. For each scale,
the GAN is fixed once trained. Then the training repeats in
next scale until the finest scale.
Algorithm 1 AIP Generation Process
Input: Single real image x, the victim classifier f
Output: Generator G to generate adversarial patches p˜
1: Obtain the attention heatmap M ;
2: Select victim location m;
3: Crop the original patch p and surrounding context C;
4: for K scales do
5: for N epochs do
6: for SD steps do
7: WDk ←WDk +∇DL;
8: end for
9: for SG steps do
10: WGk ←WGk −∇GL;
11: end for
12: end for
13: end for
14: p˜ = GK(zK , GK−1(zK−1...(G1(z1, G0(z0,~0)))...));
Experiment Results
In this section, we conducted a series of experiments to eval-
uate the attack ability in both white-box and black-box set-
tings. To assess how well the generated patches are incon-
spicuous, we do comparisons of saliency detection and hu-
man evaluation on generated adversarial patches. We also
attempt physical attacks to evaluate practical effectiveness
of our approach.
Implementation Details
We adopt similar architectures for generators (Isola et al.
2017; Zhu et al. 2017). For discriminator, we use a fully con-
volutional network with 5 conv-blocks (Shaham, Dekel, and
Michaeli 2019). In adversarial training, we use WGAN-GP
loss in (Gulrajani et al. 2017) as it is found to produce bet-
ter results with stable training. Since C&W loss (Carlini and
Wagner 2017) is proved to be effective to generate strong ad-
versarial exmaples, we adopt it as our attack loss Lfadv . Our
approach is implemented on a workstation with four GPUs
of NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2080 Ti. During the training of
AIP, we set 2000 epochs for each scale where the coarsest
scale length is 0.75 times of the original patch length. The
optimizer for all generators and discriminators is Adam with
learning rate 0.0005. All images used in our experiments are
normalized to the range of [−1, 1].
White-box attack Black-box attack
Class Index/Name InceptionV3 GoogleNet MNASNet MobileNet Robust MobileNet
283 Persian Cat 100.00% 99.22% 85.62% 90.66% 80.33%
340 Zebra 98.53% 99.36% 85.58% 90.38% 74.40%
417 Balloon 99.52% 99.19% 79.68% 90.19% 82.70%
527 Desktop Computer 99.72% 99.20% 82.23% 90.71% 77.86%
532 Table 99.95% 99.19% 86.13% 90.09% 87.09%
604 Hourglass 99.99% 99.20% 82.12% 90.59% 80.39%
717 Pickup Truck 99.97% 99.31% 85.34% 91.06% 75.65%
919 Street Sign 98.30% 99.21% 82.27% 90.10% 84.92%
964 Potpie 99.88% 99.30% 83.81% 90.85% 80.01%
975 Lakeside 99.91% 99.30% 84.00% 89.96% 71.85%
Average 99.58% 99.25% 83.68% 90.46% 79.52%
Table 1: White-box and Black attack success rate for every category’s 10 models. The white-box is conducted on InceptionV3
and black-box is then conducted on GoogleNet, MNASNet (multipier of 1.0), MobileNetV2, and MobileNetV2 with L2 robust
training ( = 3). The statistics indicates that our approach has strong attacking ability in white-box and black-box settings.
White-box and Black-box Attack
In this section, our data are randomly sampled from Ima-
geNet (Deng et al. 2009). Due to resource limitation, it is
impossible for us to use thousands of images in our exper-
iments. So we first choose 10 classes from ImageNet, and
sample 10 images in each class (see details in Table 1). In
total, 100 images are used as our evaluation set. To assess
the attack capability of adversarial patches generated by our
approach, we conduct experiments in white-box setting and
black-box setting respectively.
Figure 3: Selected adversarial patches generated by our ap-
proach. At the first glance, most of the patches are incon-
spicuous to human observers.
White-box Attack. We use Inception V3 (Szegedy et al.
2015b) as the target model for white-box attacks. The size
of generated patches is fixed as (3,40,40), which cover less
than 2% area of the input images (the input size of Incep-
tion V3 is (3,299,299)). Since the training of our approach
runs on one single image, we trained 100 models with all
images sampled above. Within each trained model, we gen-
erated 1,000 adversarial patches for evaluation.
The categorical white-box success rates are shown in the
first column of Table 1. We can see that those attacks are
of very high success rates with a 99.58% on average. A few
randomly selected examples are illustrated in Figure 3.
Transferability for Black-box Attack. In black-box set-
ting, the adversaries are not allowed to access the target
models. To perform attacks, they can only produce adversar-
ial patches with known models, then use these patches for at-
tack. Thus we simply use the 100,000 adversarial examples
generated in last experiment, in which the target model is In-
ception V3. There are four different target models for eval-
uation, namely GoogLeNet (Szegedy et al. 2015a), MNAS-
Net (Tan et al. 2019) with a depth multiplier of 1.0, Mo-
bileNetV2 (Sandler et al. 2018), and the L2 adversarially-
trained MobileNetV2 ( = 3). Note that the robust accuracy
of adversarially trained MobileNetV2 is 50.40% (Salman
et al. 2020) while the same model’s accuracy on AIP falls
below 20%. This indicates that our generated patches are
not traditional adversarial perturbations. The success rates
for black-box attack are also shown in Table 1. As expected,
there is a drop on success rates. But it is worth noting that
the average success rate on GoogLeNet is almost the same
as that on Inception V3. The reason might be they both have
inception modules. On MNASNet, MobileNetV2 and adver-
sarially trained MobileNetV2, our patches are impressive
enough as the success rates of which are 83.68% 90.46%
and 79.52% respectively. As discussed above, our approach
shows an outstanding attacking ability in the white-box set-
ting and demonstrates a satisfying result when applied on
black-box attacks. Note that the reason we don’t compare
with other patch methods is because there is no similar work
focusing on adversarial patch generation from one single im-
age.
Original Picture AIPGoogle Patch PS-GAN Original Picture AIPGoogle Patch PS-GAN
Figure 4: Examples of saliency detection for adversarial patches. We can see that our approach well reserves the visual consis-
tency compared to other approaches and does not trigger the saliency detection significantly.
Detection Risk Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the risks of adversarial patches
prone to detection from two aspects. Qualitatively, we use
visual saliency map to show the human-simulated focus
area. Quantitatively, we conduct a user study to identify if
there exists adversarial patches.
Visual Saliency Detection. Saliency detec-
tion (Montabone and Soto 2010) is developed based
on a biologically-inspired attention system. The simulated
human’s attention is highlighted in the target image to
indicate observer’s interest at first glance. With saliency
map, we can easily approximate what people are focusing
when they take a glance at the image.
We compete our synthetic patches with Google Patch
(Brown et al. 2017) and PS-GAN (Liu et al. 2019a) since
these patch-based adversaries are targeted at image classi-
fiers for digital images, while including original images as
the baseline. Note that in each background image, all the
patches are attached in the same location for fairness. Some
examples and their saliency maps are illustrated in Figure 4.
We can see that patches generated by other two methods
are easily spotted, and there are evident square areas at cor-
responding locations in saliency maps. This means these
patches have a high probability to be detected at people’s
first glance. In contrast, adversarial patches generated by our
approach can be hardly identified from saliency maps. This
indicates that patches from our approach are relatively in-
conspicuous under human observation at first glance.
User Evaluation. In this section, we conducted a user
study to evaluate the detection risks of adversarial patches.
Similarly we compare our approach with Google Patch
and PS-GAN. Specifically, we prepare 100 images, in which
50 images are with AIP adversarial patches, and the rest im-
ages are each attached with a patch from PS-GAN or Google
Patch, or are simply natural images. These images are split
into five Question Sets and in each of the Set there are 20
images. The participants are asked to pick up one question
set and label all images on which they found the existence of
synthetic patches. In total we collected 102 answer sheets, in
which the users are at least of undergraduate education level.
We calculated the rates of images with patches that are la-
beled and the statistics are summarized in Table 2. As we
can see, patches produced by Google Patch and PS-GAN
are of significantly higher probability to be detected while
ours is much lower. Though our approach cannot beat natu-
ral images on identified rates, it is much better than existing
methods. To summarize, our approach greatly reduces the
detection risks.
Natural Image Google Patch PS-GAN AIP
12.15% 93.63% 89.90% 36.96%
Table 2: Average percentage of synthetic patches on the
background images detected in user evaluation.
Further, we investigate if contents of adversarial patches
will influence the detection. In our opinion, there are two
main factors leading to an inconspicuous patch. Firstly, there
should be sufficient consistency between patches and back-
grounds. If high contrasts are found by observers, patches
will catch his/her visual attention immediately. Secondly the
content of patches should look natural, otherwise the non-
sense appearance will induce observers to figure them out.
To show this, we conduct a proof-of-concept experiment by
asking participants to grade on the patches’ natural-looking
appearances. we prepare 120 images, in which 30 of them
are the original image, 30 for the original image attached by
Google Patch, 30 for PS-GAN patch, and 30 for AIP patch.
The best should be graded with 4 and the worst graded with
1 in each group of four approaches. We collected 103 an-
swer sheets, in which the users are at least of undergraduate
education level. The average scores are shown in Table 3.
As expected, our approach earns a much closer score to nat-
ural images. What is more, we notice there exists a negative
correlation between Table 2 and Table 3, which supports our
claim that AIP is more inconspicuous and less detectable to
observers compared to existing approaches.
Natural Image Google Patch PS-GAN AIP
3.548 1.554 1.912 3.078
Table 3: Results of human evaluation grades on natural-
looking appearance for each approach.
Physical Attack in Real World
In this section, we conduct an experiment to show the at-
tacking effectiveness of our approach in real-world settings.
We choose five real-world traffic sign boards beside the
streets: three are Pedestrian-Ahead, one is Speed-Limit-15,
and one is No-Entrance. For implementation, we first take
one photo from each board by horizontal angles θ = {0◦}
and d = {1m} (camera orthodox and closest to signs).
These five traffic sign photos are correctly classified by In-
ceptionV3 as ”920 Traffic Sign”. Then we trained our mod-
els on these 5 images. For enhancing the real-world attack
capability of AIP, we add the loss function (Equation 8) with
a non-printability score (Sharif et al. 2016)
Lprint =
∑
p′∈p˜
∏
a∈A
|p′ − a|, (10)
where A is the available collection of printable RGB values
of [0, 1]3 and p′ is a pixel in our adversarial patch p˜. This is
to make sure that the colors of our digital adversarial patches
are printable from printers.
When the training is done, we printed out the gener-
ated adversarial patches. The model of printer we used is
HP Color LaserJet CP3525dn. Then to ensure the fairness
of natural lighting conditions, on another day we sticked
printed patches on the signs correspondingly and took pho-
tos of each sign at almost the same time in a day when it
is firstly sampled. Finally we took 195 photos with vari-
ous horizontal angles θ = {−30◦,−15◦, 0◦, 15◦, 30◦} and
distances d = {1m, 2m, 3m, 4m}. All photos are taken by
iPhone Xs Max.
After sampling we resized photos and normalize them
following the regular ImageNet approach, after which pho-
tos will be recognized by an ImageNet-trained InceptionV3.
The classification statistics shows that, among 162 photos
after attack, there are 60 photos that successfully fool the
classifier to make the road sign unrecognized. We show
some successful examples of physical attack in Figure 5.
Considering AIP is designed and developed on digital
settings, we see that it remains intriguing on how to build
stronger yet inconspicuous attack with limited real-world
data in physical attack settings. Nevertheless, we can safely
conclude that at least our approach has the potential to attack
the image classifiers after printing out and sticking to some
real-world objects like road signs.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 5: Examples of our physical attack. Traffic Signs are
classified as (a) 575 Golf Cart, (b) 733 Pole, (c) 999 Toilet
Tissue, and (d) 580 Green House.
Patch or Perturbation?
Images with inconspicuous patches are naturally similar to
the original images. Adversarial perturbations are strictly
within a small Lp norm ball, which also makes them imper-
ceptive to observers. But note that our approach is not gener-
ating adversarial perturbations. To show the differences, we
randomly choose 15 target images and their corresponding
AIPs generated by our approach. We also perform PGD at-
tack ( = 8) (Madry et al. 2018) and obtain the adversarial
images. Then we calculate the AIPs’ pixel difference with
original patches, and PGD-attacked samples’ pixel differ-
ence with original images. The distributions of pixel differ-
(a) (b)
Figure 6: Examples of value distribution obtained by (a) sub-
tracting PGD noise ( = 8) with original sample, and (b)
subtracting AIP patch with original patch.
ence are shown in Figure 6. We can see that there are observ-
able distributional differences between PGD attack whose
value gaps are restricted within a given radius and our ap-
proach where there exists no such perturbation constraint.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an approach of GAN-based ad-
versarial networks trained with only one image to produce
adversarial patches. Different from existing works, we con-
sider the consistency between patches and original images
to evade detection from observers. Our approach employs
multiple scales of generators with discriminators to gener-
ate patches in a coarse-to-fine way. To equip our approach
with stronger attacking capability, we consider the percep-
tual sensitivity of victim model by developing model at-
tention mechanism. Through extensive experiments, our ap-
proach shows satisfying attack capabilities, black-box trans-
ferabilities, and deployable potential in real-world settings.
What’s more, our approach is proved to be effective on re-
ducing detection risks by qualitative and quantitative evalu-
ations. We address the potential threats of inconspicuous ad-
versarial patches in real world practices. However, we still
need to consider how to further deal with the adversarial
patch’s trade-off between maliciousness and inconspicuous-
ness. In the future work, we will focus on maximizing the
real-world attack capability of adversarial patches while re-
serving least risks of being detected.
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